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THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL YARON: CONTINUING IMPUNITY
FOR THE SABRA AND SHATILLA MASSACRES

Linda A. Malone*
In December of 1999, General Amos Y aron was appointed to serve
as head of Israel's Defense Ministry. Earlier, in August of 1986, Yaron
had been appointed military attache to the United States. In reaction to the
1986 appointment, survivors of a 1982 massacre of Palestinians living in
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps located in Lebanon filed a complaint in
the District of Columbia District Court. The complaint alleged Y aron
violated U.S. treaties, customary international law, and U.S. statutes
incorporating international customary international law. The complaint
provided that:
The defendant Y aron is not entitled to any immunity from accountability
before this Court by virtue of a claim of diplomatic immunity. Article 146 of
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is an express waiver of diplomatic
immunity with respect to those alleged to have committed grave breaches as
defined by Article 147. Moreover, under the Nuremberg Principles and the
principle of customary international law known as jus cogens which has
been incorporated into the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, two
governments cannot agree to immunize a war criminal from accountability
for his acts.
The defendant Y aron is not entitled to any immunity from accountability
arising out of any otherwise arguably applicable statute of limitations, in that
customary international law provides that there shall be no statute of
limitations with respect to war crimes because of the particularly grievous
1
nature of such violations.

Nevertheless, the case was dismissed on immunity grounds.
That Y aron evaded responsibility and sanctions for his conduct at the
time of his rise through the Israeli Defense Ministry to his recent
achievement of its highest post violates international law, and dishonors
the memory of the hundreds of civilians who were brutally massacred
over a two-day period in an area of Lebanon under his direct control. This
commentary explores the past and present prohibition of such impunity
under international law, based on the findings with respect to Yaron's
responsibility as determined by the Israeli commission, which
investigated the massacres.
On September 28, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet resolved to establish a
commission of inquiry2 pursuant to Israel's Commission of Inquiry Law
1
The Palestine Yearbook of International Law, Vol. V, 1989 at 254 (on file with
author).

2

See Kahan Report at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 373, 373; see also Christopher Walker,
Begin Agrees to Hold Massacre Inquiry, TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 1982 at 1.
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of 1968,3 largely in response to the largest protest demonstration in
Israel's history. 4 The commission's charge was to examine "all the facts
and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the
Lebanese Forces against the civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra
camps. " 5 Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was
selected chairman of the commission .6
The issuance of the commission's Report, rekindled the controversy
on a new level - focusing on the individual responsibility of many high
ranking Israeli officials, including former Prime Minister Be9in, then
Minister of Defense Sharon, and then Foreign Minister Shamir. A brief
flurry of reprimands, to the extent they can be denominated as such,
followed - Sharon, one of the most harshly criticized individuals in the
Report, merely lost his portfolio. 8 No other individual prosecutions or
sanctions were imposed.
I.

PRELUDE TO THE MASSACRE

What became known in Israel as the "Peace for the Galilee" war
began on June 6, 1982. 9 From June 12 to 14, Israeli Defense Force
(I.D.F.) took over the suburbs of Beirut and joined with the Christian
forces controlling East Beirut. 10 On June 15, the Israeli Cabinet resolved
that any entry into West Beirut would be by the Phalangists with the help
of the I.D.F., and by June 25, the I.D.F. had encircled West Beirut. 11 On
3

The outline of the facts as found by the Kahan Report, which demonstrate Yaron's
responsibility, are provided in more detail in Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel
Sharon, and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres: Responsibility under International Law for
Massacres of Civilian Populations, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 373.
4

See Crisis in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1982, at 6. Other influential factors
leading to the inquiry were the resignation of Energy Minister Yitzhak Berman, outraged at
the Cabinet's failure to establish a commission of inquiry, and President Yitzhak Navon's
call for an inquiry. See Robert Fisk, Tentative Hopes for an Open Beirut, TIMES (London),
Sept. 23, 1982, at 5.
5

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 3. The "camps" actually consist of many one or two
room cement structures with several larger, mainly two-story buildings, all separated by
alleyways. MICHAEL JANSEN, THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT: WHY ISRAEL INVADED LEBANON 97
(1982).
6

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 3.

7

See JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 13-19, 1983, at 1, col. 1-2 (int'l ed., on file with author).

8

See id. at col. 3-5.

9

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 7.

10

See id.

11

See id. In the report, the Commission briefly addressed whether mere inclusion of
Phalangists in West Beirut's entry could be the basis for indirect Israeli responsibility for the
massacres. First, the Commission concluded that the June 15 resolution could not be deemed
the basis for the Phalangists' later involvement in the entry, as urged by Begin and Sharon. It
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August 19, an agreement between Lebanon, the United States, France,
Italy, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was
reached with the negotiating assistance of the United States through
Ambassador Philip C. Habib. 12 It provided for the evacuation of P.L.O.
and Syrian forces from West Beirut. By August 23, Bashir Gemayel was
elected president of Lebanon, his term of office to begin one month
later. 13
From August 21 to 26, the multinational American, French and
Italian force arrived in Beirut, and oversaw the evacuation ofP.L.O. and
Syrian forces until it was completed on September 1. 14 The Report then
notes in its chronology that
... [a]ccording to information from various sources, the terrorists did not
fulfill their obligation to evacuate all their forces from West Beirut and hand
their weapons over to the Lebanese army but left in West Beirut, according
to various estimates, approximately 2,000 fighters, as well as many arms
caches, some of which were handed over by the terrorists to the Lebanese
leftist militia "Mourabitoun". 15

The multinational force left Lebanon from September 10 to 12, after
the completion of the evacuation, but less than one week before the
massacres occurred. 16
The Report states that when word of Bashir Jemayel' s assassination
reached Israel at approximately 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 14,
Prime Minister Begin, Minister of Defense Sharon, and Chief of Staff
Eitan decided that the I.D.F. would enter West Beirut, without seeking a
Cabinet resolution to that effect. 17 Although Sharon and Eitan purportedly

found that the June circumstances had changed entirely by September, after the evacuation of
Syrian and P.L.O. forces and after Bashire Jemayel's assassination. Nevertheless, despite the
lack of a formal Cabinet resolution, the Commission concluded there was no responsibility
for the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut. The political and military reasons for
including the Phalangists justified their involvement in West Beirut, according to the Report,
negating any potential responsibility on that basis alone. See id. at 13. The decision to enter
West Beirut was also made by Begin and Sharon, without Cabinet approval. See Kahan
Report, supra note 2.
12

See id.; see also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY
NO. 415, LEBANON: PLAN FOR THE PLO EVACUATION FROM WEST BEIRUT (Aug. 1982).
13

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 7.

14

See id.

15

See id.

16

See id.

17

See id. at 8. There was no prior consultation with the Cabinet; Foreign Minister Sharnir
was the only minister informed of this decision, which he endorsed. The Commission
concluded that no indirect responsibility for the massacres could be predicated on this
decision, because of the "extraordinary emergency situation" created by Bashir Jemayel' s
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discussed including Phalangists in the operation, the Commission
determined it was not mentioned to Prime Minister Begin. 18 Chief of Staff
Eitan testified that at 8:30p.m. on September 14, he and Defense Minister
Sharon agreed that Phalangists would enter the Sabra and Shatilla
camps. 19
The operating order for the entry into West Beirut that played a
pivotal part in the ensuing massacres was Order Number 6 to the I.D.F.,
which provided in part that "the refugee camps are not to be entered.
Searching and mopping u~ the camps will be done by the
Phalangists/Lebanese army. "2
II. THE MASSACRE UNFOLDS

At this point, the events that ultimately culminated in the massacres
at the Sabra and Shatilla camps were set in motion. Sometime in the
evening between September 14 and September 15, Chief of Staff Eitan
met in Beirut with Major General Drori and the division commander? 1 At
3:30a.m. on September 15, Chief of StaffEitan went to the Phalangists'
headquarters and, according to his own testimony, "ordered the Phalangist
commanders to effect a general mobilization of all their forces, impose a
general curfew on all areas under their control, and be ready to take part
in the fighting." 22 The Phalangist commanders asked for twenty-four
hours to prepare?3 Chief of Staff Eitan then asked that a Phalan¥,ist
liaison officer come to the Israeli division's forward command post. 4
On September 15, 1982, the entry into West Beirut began. 25 The
I.D.F. entered West Beirut shortly before 6:00 a.m. 26 That same day
between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Defense Minister Sharon met at the
forward command post with Chief of Staff Eitan who reported his
agreement with the Phalangists for their entry into the camps?7 Sharon
approved the agreement and phoned Prime Minister Begin from the roof

assassination. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 13. The Lebanese army, it states, could not
have enforced order in West Beirut. See id.
18

See id.

19

See id at 9.

20

See id. at 8.

21

See id. at 9

22

See id.

23

SeeKahan Report, supra note 2, at 9.

24

See id.

25

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 9.

26

See id.
See id.

27
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of the command post.Z8 Yet, according to the Report, Sharon only
informed Begin that there was no resistance in Beirut and that the
operations were going well. 29 Also present at the forward command post
were the Defense Minister's aide Duda'i, the Director of Military
Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy, a representative of the Mossad, Major
General Drori,30 and Brigadier General Yaron, among others. Duda'i's
notes of the meeting stated that the Phalangists were to be sent into the
camps, and that Sharon had s~oken twice with the Prime Minister from
the roof of the command post. 1 On September 16, the Defense Minister's
office issued a document signed by Duda'i summarizing in two crucial,
controversial sentences Sharon's instructions in this meeting regarding the
entry into West Beirut: "Only one element, and that is the I.D.F., shall
command the forces in the area. For the operation in the camps the
Phalangists should be sent in.'m The document was directed to Chief of
Staff Eitan, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Director of Military
Intelligence. 33 It is known, from a stamp on that office's copy, that the
Director of Military Intelligence's office received the document. 34
Witnesses disagreed about whether this instruction signified that
Phalangists' forces were to be directly under I.D.F. command. 35
Thursday, September 16, 1982, was the day on which the three-day
massacres began. In the early morning hours, Chief of Staff Eitan
returned to Te1Aviv. 36 At 10:00 a.m., Sharon met in his office with Chief
of Staff Eitan, the Director of Mili~ Intelligence, Brigadier General
Saguy, and Mr. Duda'i, among others. 3 Eitan announced, "the whole city
is in our hands, complete quiet prevails now, the camps are surrounded,
the Phalangists are to go at 11:00-12:00. Yesterday we spoke to them ...
The situation now is that the entire city is in our hands, the camps are all
closed.''38Specifically referring to a map, Eitan stated that I.D.F. forces
surrounded the Sabra and Shatilla camps, and that it was agreed the
28

See id.

29

See id.

30

Major General Drori was commander oflsrael's Northern Region in addition to being
in charge of the Golan Heights and the Lebanese territories occupied at the beginning of the
war. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 5.
31

See id.

32

See id. at 10-11.

33

See id. at 11.

34

See id.

35

See id.

36

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 10.

37

See id.
Id. (emphasis added).

38
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Phalangists would go in at their discretion, after a coordinating session
with the Israeli officials. 39
The first session coordinating the Phalangists' entry into the camps
was held at 11:00 a.m. on September 16.40 Unnamed Phalangist
commanders met with Major General Drori at the headquarters of one of
the divisions. 41 It was again agreed that the Phalangists would enter the
camps, coordinating their entry with Brigadier General Y aron that very
afternoon at the forward command post. 42 It was also agreed that a
company of 150 fighters from the Phalangist force would enter the camps
from south to north and from west to east.43 Brigadier General Yaron,
discussed purported terrorist locations in the camp and, apparently still
apprehensive about the Phalangists' involvement, also warned the
Phalangists commanders not to harm the civilian population.44
The Report then notes that Yaron required safety checks upon the
Phalangists. The Report first remarks that Yaron set up lookout posts on
the roof of the forward command post and on a nearby roof "even though
he knew that it was impossible to see very much of what was going on in
the camps from these lookouts. " 45 An additional measure, not specified in
the Report and described only in the classified Appendix B to the Report,
was imgosed to ascertain the actions of the Phalangists' forces in the
camps. 6 Yaron and the Phalangists also stipulated that a Phalangist
liaison officer with a "communications set" would be present at all times
on the roof of the forward command post with a Moss ad liaison officer at
the Phalangists' headquarters. 47
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, September 16, the
Phalangists entered the camps, initially entering the Shatilla camp from
the west and southwest, as directed. 48Around 7:00p.m., Israeli Lieutenant
39

See id.

40

See id. at II.

41

See id.

42

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at II.

43

See id.

44

See id.

45

See id.

46

See id.

47

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at II.

48

See id. Other sources have since placed the exact time at 5:15p.m. The Report at this
point in its analysis, in a marked departure from its generally unemotional tone, states that
there were "armed terrorist forces" in the camps, whose extent they could not establish but
whose arrns were being used against the I.D.F. As noted in the Report, these hidden arms and
terrorists never materialized. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 6-7. The Commission
concludes that this terrorist force had not been evacuated for two reasons: renewal of the
underground terrorist activity at a later period, and to protect the civilian population, which
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Elul overheard a transmission over the Phalangists' communication set to
Elie Hobeika while he was on the roof of the command post.49 He hear~ a
Phalangist officer from the forces in the camp tell Hobeika there were 50
women and children and ask what he should do. 50 Hobeika replied, "[t]his
is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that, you know
exactly what to do." This remark was followed by "raucous laughter" by
the Phalangists on the roof. 51 Brigadier General Yaron, who was also on
the roof, asked Lieutenant Elul what he had overheard.52 When Lieutenant
Elul reported the above information, Y aron spoke to Hobeika in English
for about five minutes but Lieutenant Elul did not hear the conversation. 53
According to Yaron's testimony, however, the conversation
Lieutenant Elul relayed to him was only that "one of the Phalangists had
asked the commander what to do with 45 people, and reply had been to
do with them what God orders you to do" (which Yaron said he took to
be a reference to the treatment of forty-five dead terrorists). 54 Yaron
testified that he believed Elul' s report involved the same incident he
received in a report that evening from another source, an intelligence
officer.55 Shortly before 8:00p.m., an intelligence officer on the roof of
the forward command post ordered two actions to obtain information on
the Phalangists' activities.56 The Report does not reveal what these actions

had remained in the camps- because given the hostility prevailing between the various sects
and organizations, a population without armed protection was in danger of massacre. In a
clear jab at the United States' failure to provide protection for the civilian population, the
Commission adds that during the evacuation negotiations, a "guarantee for the safety of the
Muslims in West Beirut was given by the representative of the United States who conducted
the negotiations, following assurances received from the government of Israel and from
Lebanon."
The author has purposefully refrained from use of the term "terrorist," because it tends to
be an inflammatory, meaningless term, particularly in the circular context of violence and
retaliation in the Mideast. Two examples will suffice to prove this point. Begin was the head
of Irgun, a Jewish dissident organization, at the time of its mass murder of 250 Palestinian
villagers in 1948 at Deir Yassin. Anwar Sadat spent thirty-one months in prison for his
involvement in the assassination of the Egyptian Minister of Finance in 1946, for which he
was later acquitted and released. Of course, both of these "terrorists" later received the Nobel
Peace Prize for their efforts toward peace in the Mideast.
49

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12.

50

See id.

51

See id.

52

See id.

53

See id.

54

See id.
See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12.

55
56

See id.
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were, because they are only outlined in the confidential Appendix B. 57 As
a result of one of the actions, the intelligence officer received a report that
the Phalangists' liaison officer overheard a radio transmission from a
Phalangist inside the camps, which stated he was holding forty-five
people and asked the liaison officer what to do. The Phalangist officer
replied, "Do the will of God" or words to that effect. 58 The intelligence
officer received this report at approximately 8:00p.m., but did not convey
it to anyone else, including Y aron, until a briefing with Y aron that night
at 8:40 p.m. 59 The Report concludes that, although Yaron confused the
two reports (from Elul and from the intelligence officer) in his testimony,
they were clearly two different and separate reports of separate
incidents. 60 The Commission had little difficulty determining that
Lieutenant Elul had informed Y aron of the content of the conversation he
overheard, as Elul had testified. 61
Also at approximately 8:00 p.m., another report regarding
Phalangists' indiscriminate killing was made in Yaron's presence. The
Phalangists' liaison officer "G." told various people in the command post
dining room, including Yaron and I.D.F officers, that about 300 people,
including civilians, had been killed in the camps. 62 Shortly thereafter, he
reduced the number of casualties from 300 to 120, but no one took action
because of either report. 63
At 8:40 p.m. in Beirut an update briefing was held in the forward
command post for I.D.F. officers lead by Brigadier General Y aron. 64 The
Divisional Intelligence Officer who received the earlier report regarding
the Phalangists' liaison officer's order to "do the will of God" reported on
the Phalangists' operations in the camps. 65 The officer's report and
exchange with Y aron create serious implications:
Intelligence Officer_;_ [T]hey, it turns out, are pondering what to do with the
population they are finding inside. On the one hand, it seems, there are not
terrorists there, in the camp. Sabra camp is empty. On the other hand, they
have amassed women, children, and apparently also old people, with whom
they don't exactly know what to do ... and evidently they had some sort of
decision in principle that they would concentrate them together, and lead

57

See id.

58

See id.

59

See id. at 13.

60

See id. at 12.

61

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12.

62

See id. at 13.

63

See id.

64

See id.
See id.

65
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them to some place outside the camps. On the other hand, I also heard from(the Phalangists' liaison officer G.) ... that 'do what your heart tells you
because everything comes from God.'

***
Brigadier General Y aron: Nothing, no, no. I went to see him up top and
they have no problems at all.
Intelligence Officer_;_ People remaining in the field? Without their lives
being in any danger?
Brigadier General Y aron: It will not, will not harm them. 66

The Phalangists' actions against the civilians in the camps were not
mentioned again. In his testimony, Yaron explained he had interrupted the
officer because he had warned the Phalangists' officers on the roof not to
harm civilians and had been assured they would issue such orders. 67
Between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. this same Divisional Intelligence
Officer contacted Northern Command on his own and told the Deputy
Intelligence Officer of the Phalangist officer's statement that 300
terrorists and civilians had been killed and that he had subsequently
reduced the number to 120. 68 The recipients of the report at the General
Staff Branch conveyed it by telephone to the Chef De Bureau of the
Director of Military Intelligence at 5:30a.m. on Friday morning. 69
Y aron did not inform Major General Drori of any of the reports he
had received about Phalangists' killing civilians, not even Friday morning
when Drori contacted him for a report about various matters relating to
the war. 70
During Thursday night and early Friday morning, reports of civilian
killings began to circulate among the I.D.F. officers at the forward
command post. When the Phalangists' liaison officer asked a Lieutenant
Colonel Treiber for greater illumination of the camps, he refused, because
the "Phalangists had killed 300 people."71 For some unexplained reason,
Treiber subsequently ordered that more illumination be provided. 72

66

See id.

67

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 13.

68

See id.

69

See id.

70

See id. at 14-15.

71

See id. at 15.

72

See id.
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The confirmation attempts continued throughout Friday morning, but
no confirmations were successful. As a result, the report was treated as if
unreliable and was not circulated according to standard procedure. 73
Meanwhile, I.D.F. soldiers outside the camps detected more killing
and violent actions against refugees in the camps during those morning
hours. 74 Lieutenant Grabowsky, stationed 200 meters from the camp on
an earth embankment, witnessed Phalangist soldiers take men, women
and children out of the camps' area and lead them to the area near the
stadium. 75 Between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., he saw two Phalangist
soldiers hit two young men, saw them lead the men back into the camp,
heard a few shots and then saw the two Phalangists come out alone. 76 He
climbed up on the embankment and saw that the Phalangist soldiers had
killed a group of five women and children and later saw a Phalangist kill
another civilian. 77 Other soldiers deterred him from making a report to his
superiors. They told him that the battalion commander had already been
informed that civilians were being killed, and he had only replied, "We
know, its not to our liking, and don't interfere."78
The killing continued for another twenty-three hours. Afterward,
Yaron met with Drori but, according to Drori, said nothing to him about
the "excesses"committed by the Phalangists. 79 Yaron's version differed.
He claimed he had telephoned Drori in the morning, because "something
smelled fishy" to him, which led Drori to meet with him at 11:00 that
morning. 80 The testimony regarding their discussion during that 11 :00
meeting differs even more. Colonel Duvdevani was also present at the
meeting. He said that he told Drori and Yaron he had a "bad feeling"
about what was going on in the camps (based on the Phalangists' Officer
G.'s report of approximately 300 persons dead and Israeli lack of
knowledge about the events). 81 Yaron testified that he told Drori
everything he knew at the time. 82 The only information, which Drori
testified he heard about the Phalangists' operations in the camps was that
73

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 16.

74

See id. at 17.

75

See id.

76

See id.

77

See id. What the lieutenant testified he saw from an earth embankment 200 meters from
the camp is particularly interesting in that supposedly nothing was visible from the roof of
the seven story command post, also 200 meters from the camp.
78

See id.

79

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18. This meeting happened at an unspecified time
following a 9:00 meeting with Phalangists.
80

See id. at 15.

81

See id.

82

See id.
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they were "carrying out 'an unclean mopping-up' - that is, their soldiers
were not calling on the residents- as I.D.F. soldiers do- to come out
before opening fire on a house which was to be 'mopped up,' but they
were 'going into the house firing."' 83 Drori nevertheless commanded
Yaron to, in turn, order the Phalangists to stop where they were in the
camps and to advance no further. 84 Yaron, however, testified he had, in
fact, suggested such an order to Drori. 85 In any event, the Report states
that such an order was conveyed to the Phalangists' commanders. 86 At
this same meeting, Drori telephoned Chief of StaffEitan, told him that the
Phalangists had ~erhaps "gone too far," and that he had ordered the
operation halted. 7
At 11:00 a.m., journalist Ze' ev Schiff met with Minister Zipori at the
Minister's office to tell him about the report he had received of
"slaughter" in the camps. 88 Minister Zipori in Schiff s presence, called
Foreign Minister Shamir to discuss Schiff's report. 89 Minister Zipori
testified that he told Shamir he had received reports that the Phalangists
"are carrying out a slaughter" and asked Shamir to check the report with
the United States and Israeli officials with whom Shamir was to meet at
12:30.90
At 12:30, Minister Shamir met in his office with United States
Ambassador Morris Draper, other United States representatives, Minister
of Defense Sharon, the director of Military Intelligence Saguy, the head
of General Security Services, and others not named. 91 From the Report, it
appears that no one in the meeting made any mention of the Phalangists'
presence or activities in the camps. The meeting ended at 3:00p.m.; the
Foreign Minister went home and took no further action on the Report. 92
The killing continued for another seventeen hours.
Lieutenant Grabowsky, who had witnessed the Phalangists' treatment
of civilians from the earth embankment outside the camps, continued his
own inquiry that afternoon. One of his soldiers, at his request, asked
Phalangist soldiers in Arabic why they were killing civilians. 93 He was
83

See id.

84

See id.

85

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 15.

86

See id.

87

See id. at 16.

88

See id.

89

See id.

90

See id. at 17.

91

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 17.

92

See id.
See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 17.

93
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told, "the pregnant women will give birth to terrorists and children will
grow up to be terrorists." 94 Throughout the afternoon, the I.D.F. soldiers
saw the Phalangists' treatment of men, women and children and heard
complaints and stories of the massacre. One soldier said he heard a report
to the battalion commander, describing the Phalangists as "running
wild."95 Lieutenant Grabowsky left the area at 4:00p.m., and later that
afternoon related what he had seen to his commander and other officers. 96
They referred him to his brigade commander, to whom he reported at 8:00
p.m., again conveying what he had seen earlier in the day. 97 The battalion
commander, in his testimony, denied receiving any report of killings or
mistreatment of civilians other than the report that 300 were killed on
Thursday night. 98 The Report says there was no need to resolve these
testimonial conflicts beyond the soldiers' attempts to report the acts to
their superiors, and that these soldiers' reports did not reach Yaron or
Drori. 99 The Commission sent no 15(a) notice to the battalion
commander, leaving any further investigation of his conduct to the
I.D.F.100
At 3:30 fc.m. Chief of StaffEitan met with Drori at the Khalde airport
near Beirut. 01 They traveled from there to a meeting at Phalangist
headquarters, joined along the way by Brigadier General Y aron. 102 Drori
testified that he told the Chief of Staff what he knew of the Phalangists'
actions and his reasons for halting their operation, and yet Chief of Staff
Eitan did not see fit to ask any questions about the Phalangists' actions
nor the order halting them. 103 At 4:00p.m. Chief of Staff Eitan, Brigadier
General Yaron, and Major General Drori met with the Phalangist staff at
Phalangist headquarters. 104 In this meeting, despite Drori' s earlier order
halting the Phalangists and the report on their actions, the Chief of Staff,
"expressed his positive impression received from the statement by the
Phalangist forces and their behavior in the field" and concluded that they
"continue action, mopping up the empty camps south of Fakhani until
tomorrow [Saturday] at 5:00A.M., at which time they must stop their
94

See id.

95

See id.

96

See id.

97

See id.

98

See id.

99

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18.

100

See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.

104

See id.
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action due to American pressure. There is a chance that the Lebanese
Army will enter instead of them." 105 The Chief of Staff also testified that
the Phalangists told him that "everything was alright, that the Americans
are pressuring them to leave and they would leave by 5:00A.M...." 106
The Chief of Staff did not ask the Phalangists any questions or
debrief them about activities in the camps. Eitan said he refused to permit
them to send in more forces, but Yaron testified that there were no
restrictions placed on the Phalangists' use of additional forces. 107 The
killing continued beyond 5:00 a.m. the following day [Saturday], until
8:00 a.m. An unanswered mystery raised by this portion of the Report is
what knowledge United States officials had of the Phalangists' operations
at this time that were bringing "American pressure" to bear on the
Phalangists to halt their operations. 108
During the meeting, the Phalangists requested a tractor "to demolish
illegal structures." 109 At the end of the meeting, as Brigadier General
Yaron testified, it was "clear" that "the Phalangists could still enter the
camps, bring in tractors and do what they wanted ...... no The one tractor
105

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18. This order is not the only controversial directive
issued by Eitan. In a January 22, 1983 Philadelphia Inquirer article, it was reported that nine
Israeli soldiers on trial for mistreating Arab detainees submitted to the court through their
attorneys a memorandum issued by Eitan ordering harsh treatment of Palestinian
demonstrators. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, THE BITTER YEAR 21
(1983). According to the Jerusalem Post, Eitan used the military slang term "turtur''
(harassment or bullying) to describe treatments to be given detainees. See JERUSALEM PosT,
Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 1983, at 4, col. 2 (intDl ed., on file with author).
Eitan had originally stated when the massacres came to light that the Phalangists had
entered the camps unbeknownst to the Israelis. See JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 22, 1982, at 1,
col. 2 (on file with author).
106

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19. See also David K. Shipler, Killings a Shock,
Israeli Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1982, at 10.
107

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19.

108

When asked for additional details of that aspect of the discussion, Major General Drori
said he could not recall any details. See id. The New York Times reported that at 9 a.m. on
Saturday a member of the United States embassy staff entered Shatilla, established that a
massacre had taken place, and informed his superiors. See Thomas L. Friedman, Crisis in
Lebanon: The Beirut Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1982, at 19. Even earlier, according to
that same article, a group of American journalists spoke with a member of the American
embassy staff Friday around 3:00 p.m. and mentioned the rumors they had heard that the
Phalangists had entered Shatilla. The charge d'affaires was immediately alerted and
contacted Amin Jemayel, who said he would check on the report. The article concludes
"[t]his and other evidence suggests that the Phalange Party leadership, including Mr.
Gemayel, the new President, may not have known what the militiamen were doing." See id at
20.
109

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19.

110

See id. at 18-19.
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supplied, with its I.D.F. markings removed, was purportedly returned by
the Phalangists shortly after they received it, since they had their own
tractors, which they used (in large part to pile up the bodies) that night
and the following morning. 111 The most appalling lack of concern for the
camp-situation was the absence of questions to the Phalangists'
commanders about the rumors and reports of murdered and mistreated
civilians in the camps. 112
The Phalangists did not leave the camps at 5:00 a.m., as ordered. At
6:30 a.m., when Brigadier General Yaron learned this, he gave the
Phalangist commander on the scene the much-needed order - that they
must vacate the camps "without delay." 113 Between 6:30a.m. and 7:00
a.m., a group of Phalangist soldiers entered the Gaza Hospital in Sabra
and took a group of doctors, nurses and foreign national workers out of
the hospital under armed guard. 114 Two doctors and a nurse who later
testified before the Commission said they saw several cowses, groups of
people guarded by armed soldiers, and bulldozers. 1 5 They were
interrogated by the Phalangists and then taken to the I.D .F. forward
command post from which they were later released. 116 It was not until
approximately 8:00a.m. that the last of the Phalangists left the camps. 117
In all likelihood, exactly who or how many were killed in the
massacres will never be known. The official burial of the dead was done
by the Red Cross, which counted 328 bodies, including Palestinians,
Lebanese, Iranians, Syrians, Pakistanis and Algerians. 118 Some survivors
buried their less fortunate family members themselves. 119 The Phalangists
removed truckloads of bodies. 120 Other bodies are believed to remain
under the ruins or in mass graves the Phalangists dug. 121 The I.D.F. itself
estimates 700 to 800 were killed. 122 Other estimates place the death toll at
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See Friedman, supra note 108, at 20; Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19.
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See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 9.
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See id. at 20.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 21. Palestinians were not the only victims. Of the
estimated 328 dead, according to the Red Cross, there were 45 Lebanese, 21 Iranians, 10
Syrians, 13 Pakistanis, and 2 Algerians in addition to Palestinians.
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See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 21.
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approximately a thousand, 123 with more than 900 people driven away in
trucks. 124 One Israeli source suggested the total number civilians killed
was 3,000. 125
ill. THE AFTERMATH AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The Commission determined two levels of responsibility- direct and
indirect. 126 According to the Commission, those directly res~onsible were
only those who "actually perpetrated" the massacre itself. 1 7
The Report concludes that Israel was indirectly responsible for the
massacres:
[T]he decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was
taken without consideration of the danger- which the makers and executors
of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - that the Phalangists
would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps,
and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger.
Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to
arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was
taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them,
and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the
Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both reflects and exhausts
Israel's indirect responsibility for what occurred in the refugee camps. 128

For the nine individuals sent notices of harm by the Commission then Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, Foreign Minister
Shamir, Chief of StaffEitan, Director of Military Intelligence Saguy, the
Head of Moss ad, Major General Drori, Brigadier General Yaron, and
Sharon's aide Dud'i- their personal liability under international law for
the massacres would be determined, at that time, primarily by the
Nuremberg Principles, 129 affirmed by the United Nations General
123

See Massacre in Beirut: The Evidence from the Shameful Days, TIMES (London), Sept.
24, 1982 at 6.
124

For example, at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, a reporter for Danish television watched as a
cattle truck at the southern gate of Shatilla was loaded by Christian militiamen with women
and children from the camp. What happened to them is unknown. Individual or mass forcible
transfers of civilians from occupied territory to any territory of any country is prohibited,
regardless of motive under article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
125

See AMNON KAPELIOUK, SABRA AND SHATILLA, INQUIRY IN A MASSACRE, Ch. II (1984).

126

See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 23-29.

127

See id. at 23.

128

See id. at 29.

129

See Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, 3 Bevans 1238.
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Assembly 130 and acknowledged as part of customar6 international law by
the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case. 31 The tragic irony of
the application of the Nuremberg Principles to the Israeli officials is that
these Principles were originally formulated to punish the atrocities of the
Nazi regime against the Jewish people. 132
Brigadier General Yaron, according to the Report, received reports of
the killings of women and children on Thursday evening, yet ( 1) did not
check the report; (2) did not pass the reports on to the G.O.C. and Chief
of Staff; and (3) did not take appropriate steps to stop the Phalangists and
protect civilians. 133 It is inescapable, based on the Commission's
conclusions, that at least seven of the nine individuals, including Y aron,
should have known of the likelihood of a massacre before the
Phalangists' entry, knew or should have known a massacre was going on
after their entry and yet failed to take appropriate steps to protect the
civilian population. Under the customary international law of command
responsibility and the Nuremberg Principles, those individuals could
therefore be responsible for war crimes. 13
The Kahan Report, no matter how well intentioned, failed to result in
any meaningful sanctions. Begin, Sharon, and Shamir were all criticized
by the Commission - yet Begin stayed in office until he retired; 135 Shamir
130

See G.A.Res. 95(a), U.N.Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946).

131

See Attorney General v. Eichmann, 361.L.R. 5 (Isr. D.C. (Jm.) 1961), 361.L.R. 277
(lsr. S. Ct. 1962). See also F. BOYLE, INTENATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION AS AN
APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1983) (Ch. IV), at 15.
132

After World War II, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and
France wrote the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which was subsequently
applied in the trial of the German defendants at Nuremberg. It provided for individual
criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as
defined in the Charter. See BOYLE, supra note 131.
133

See id. at 19.

134

Analysis of responsibility of the individuals for crimes against peace for the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon is beyond the scope of this article, and fully addressed in Malone, supra
note 3. The Nuremberg Principles in Article 6(c) define crimes against humanity as
" ... murder, extermination, ... and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population .... " Refinement of the elements of the crime by scholars and the International
Tribunals have focused on the extent to which the crime requires that the acts have been
committed pursuant to a state policy or systematically. The potential breadth of this issue
alone in the context of the invasion of Lebanon is beyond the scope of this analysis, given
the more well established grounds for liability for grave breaches in the case of Yaron's
potential liability.
135

In an article on Begin's resignation, political correspondent Mark Segal speculated that
Begin's "cruelest moment" in his Lebanese adventure came "when Begin finally recognized
the reckless and irresponsible advice he had accepted from the two generals he so admired
and trusted -Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan." He goes on to remark that "Begin may today
regret not having carried out the implied recommendation of the Kahan Report by dismissing
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became the new Prime Minister; 136 and Sharon remained in the Cabinet
(although without his portfolio). 137
Under the international law of command responsibility, a commander
who knows, or should know, troops or other persons subject to his control
are about to commit or have committed war crimes and fails to take the
necess~ and reasonable steps to stop them is responsible for such
crimes. 1 8 The Kahan Report concluded that Y aron should have known
(and, in fact, he may very well have known) of the likelihood of a
massacre and did nothing to keep the Phalangists from entering the camps
nor did he stop the Phalangists once he received information that civilians
were being killed. Even though the Phalangists were not under his direct
chain of command, the Report makes it clear that Y aron, more than
anyone else among the named Israeli individuals, exercised on-site, direct
control of the Phalangists' entry and operations in the camps. In addition,
his failure to intervene is complicity in genocide or conspiracy to commit
genocide, assuming that the requisite intent for genocide is established. In
the language of the Genocide Convention, there must be "intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
Sharon from his cabinet." See JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 25-0ct. 1, 1983, at 15, col. 5-6 (intDl
ed., on file with author).
136

See David K. Shipler, Cabinet in Israel Headed by Shamir is Voted in, 60-53, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at AI and atA3 (setting forth the relatively unchanged list of Cabinet
members, including Mordechai Zipori as Minister of Communications).
137

Sharon has said that as long as he continues to have "some influence," he would
continue to serve in the government. See JERUSALEM POST, July 31-Aug. 6, 1983, at 9, col. 1
(int'l ed., on file with author). To quote Jonathan Randal, senior foreign correspondent of the
Washington Post:
[t]he main culprit, Ariel Sharon, neatly dodges the spirit if not the letter of the 108-page
report enjoining him to resign. Resign he did as Defense Minister, only to stay on as
minister without portfolio and to join two key parliamentary commissions, on defense and
Lebanese affairs. Sharon made clear this was his, and Begin's, way of rejecting the
commission's verdict of Israel's "indirect responsibility" for the slaughter.
JONATHAN C. RANDAL, GOING ALL THEWAY: CHRISTIAN WARLORDS, ISRAEUADVENTURERS,
AND THE WAR IN LEBANON, 289 (1983). See also JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 13-19, 1983, at 1,
col. 3-5, and at 2, col. 1-5 (int'l ed., on file with author) (evaluating the friction over
Sharon's ouster as Defense Minister). Sharon was reported to have "lashed out" at his
colleagues in the governing Herut party for denying him a portfolio in the newly formed
government of Yitzhak Shamir. See Sharon Asks Portfolio in Israeli Government, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1984, at A3. As to other of the named individuals found responsible by the
Commission, Saguy was dismissed as Israel's chief of military intelligence and Yaron was
stripped of his field command. See Commanders in Disgrace, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1983,
at 6. Eitan retired as scheduled in April of 1983. See David K. Shipler, Israel's Military
Chief Retires and is Replaced by his Deputy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1983, at 8.
138

See Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); See also U.S. Dep't of Army, Field
Manual27-10, Law of Land Warfare para. 501, at 178-79 (1956).
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as such." 139 At the very least, Yaron acted with reckless disregard of the
likelihood of massacres, but the mens rea element for genocide may
necessitate a finding of purpose or knowledge for that particular liability.
Nevertheless, Yaron' s clear responsibility for war crimes constituting
grave breaches obligates each and every state to initiate prosecution for
these offenses. 140
At the time that these crimes were committed, Yaron was not entitled
to claim immunity either under the statute of limitations or the principles
of sovereign immunity. His ineligibility for immunity has become even
clearer in the progressive development of international law since that
time. Although some courts still cling to the position that sovereign
immunity may be available as a defense to war crimes and crimes against
humanity, landmark decisions to the contrary, such as the Pinochet
decision, the Statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Treaty of
Rome establishing the International Criminal Court, have unequivocally
rejected immunity as a defense. International law in this area now carries
with it the once missing element, which often called into question its
nature as "law" - mandatory imposition of sanctions.
When sanctions are not imposed for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, the fault is attributable to lack of resources or political will,
not the inadequacies of international law. In 1996, the International
Human Rights Law Institute embarked on a project to address the
growing problem of impunity of individuals guilty of crimes, which must
be prosecuted under international law. 141 The project culminated in a
document of "Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity for
International Crimes." The Principles require criminal prosecution for
grave breaches, torture, and genocide (among other international crimes),
and direct all states to prosecute crimes against humanity. In addition, the
Principles require removal of individuals responsible for international
139

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948, S. Treaty Doc. No. 81-1,78 U.N.T.S. 277.
140

Under Article 146 of the Geneva Conventions, the state parties must enact legislation
to provide "effective penal sanctions" for persons committing "grave breaches" as defined in
Article 147. The parties are obligated to search for such violators and bring them to justice.
"Grave breaches" are defined in Article 147 to include "willful killing, torture, or inhuman
treatment... " Under common Article 1, it is the responsibility of the states to "undertake to
respect and to ensure respect" for the Convention in all circumstances. See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
141

The proceedings of the first conference at the Holocaust Museum in Washington were
published in 14 Nouvelles Etudes Penales. The proceedings of a succeeding international
conference in Siracusa, Italy in September, 1997, were published in Accountability for
International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Vol. 59 Autumn 1996 No.4.
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crimes from public office and the military, after according the individual
due process in evaluating responsibility. Although never prosecuted,
Yaron's prosecution was required by international law and is not subject
to the defenses of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, or the
defense of superior orders, a defense also precluded in the Siracusa
Principles. Having already violated international law through its failure to
prosecute, Israel compounded its violation in appointing Yaron to such a
prominent and influential position. The appointment itself was prohibited
by the Principles. The commentary to the Principles demonstrates that
public appointment conflicts with state practice, thus violating general
princirles of international law, even if not yet customary international
law. 14 As negotiations for peace enter yet another fragile phase, and
Israel demands punishment for crimes committed against Israelis, the state
elevates to one of its most important posts, one of its most notorious
human rights violators. The successful reconstruction of civil society
depends upon both Palestinians and Israelis restoring public confidence in
governmental institutions and, in this case, establishing new confidence in
the Israeli military administration.
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Following his appointment, the National Lawyers Guild, the Center of Constitutional
Rights, and Madre put out statements condemning the appointment.

